This article tries to assess the standards governing cyber operations in the course of military occupation from the perspective of the aforementioned Manual. According to Tallinn Manual 2.0, cyber operations cannot alone suffice to establish or maintain the degree of authority over territory necessary to constitute an occupation. However, these operations can be employed to help establish or maintain the requisite authority to constitute occupation. Additionally, they may be employed to disrupt or degrade computer systems used by and Occupying Power to maintain authority over the occupied territory. Pursuant to the Manual, protected persons in occupied territory must be respected and protected from the harmful effects of cyber operations. Furthermore, the Occupying Power shall take all the measures in its power to restore and ensure public order and safety, while respecting the laws in force in the country, including the laws applicable to cyber activities. In addition, the Occupying Power may take measures necessary to ensure its general security, including the integrity and reliability of its own cyber systems. And finally, to the extent the law of occupation permits the confiscation or requisition of property, taking control of cyber infrastructure or systems is likewise permitted. It appears that the traditional rules governing law of military occupation stipulated in 1907 Hague Regulations as well as the Fourth Geneva Convention are applied during the conduct of cyber operations and on cyber activities and properties. In spite of its undeniable role in the effort to clarify international law on cyber operations, the Manual is faced with challenges and gaps such as non-binding nature, non-incorporation of all rules of military occupation and non-sufficient attention to requirements of cyberspace. It is expected that at least some of them would be taken into consideration in Tallinn Manual 3.0 which is managed to be published in 2026.